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I. Introduction
Even as the United States continues to prosecute the Global War on Terror and engage in on-going warfighting and nation-building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the issue of deterrence has reasserted itself upon the collective consciousness and lexicon of U.S. national security leadership and homeland security officials. Concerns about a rising China, a resurgent Russian, and unfriendly and dangerous regimes in North Korea and Iran, as well as a stockpile of aging nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal has once again brought deterrence to the fore.
It would appear that much of the deterrence discussion is focused on either the use of nuclear weapons or the U.S. response to nuclear proliferation. On 8 February 2008, Stephen
Hadley, National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush, addressed the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Mr. Hadley's remarks addressed the President's Nuclear Posture Review, the resultant "New Triad," weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorism. They focused largely on the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials and deter potential adversaries in possession of these weapons.
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This and similar statements from senior U.S. officials demonstrate that even 17 years after the end of the Cold War-era, the U.S. defense establishment still associates "deterrence" almost exclusively with nuclear weapons and the United States' overwhelming advantage in nuclear weapons quantity and capability. In 2001, Congress directed the Department of Defense to conduct the Nuclear Posture Review "to lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten years." 4 The review resulted in the establishment of a New Triad, which expanded the triad concept beyond that of the classic mix of manned bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The New Triad includes the following capabilities:
-Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);
-Defenses (both active and passive); and -A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.
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The establishment of this New Triad demonstrates that the United States security and defense establishment has moved beyond the rather simplistic, classical deterrent triad of the Cold War. The New Triad seeks to add conventional and nuclear defensive capability, "targeting" the offensive nuclear capability of peer competitors or rogue nuclear states. While this is a laudable effort, the New Triad is only a start, especially as it relates to the deterrence of an adversary's use of biological weapons. In order to credibly deter or defeat an adversary's biological threat or attack, it is imperative that the U.S. revise the New Triad by adding biodefensive capability to its current suite of capabilities. limitations of the national response. The threat is real-U.S. intelligence estimates caution that terrorist groups are attempting to increase their biological capability by recruiting knowledgeable scientists. 7 This fact, combined with the rapid, worldwide march forward in the field of biotechnology, makes it critical to examine the nation's posture in this area in an increasingly complex national security environment.
This paper will argue that the United States needs to move beyond the kinetic strike (both nuclear and conventional) aspects of deterrence to look at the problem in a more holistic manner, specifically addressing the matter of deterring or defeating a biological attack. The United States will need to develop its biodefensive and "bioforensic" capabilities in order to convince potential aggressors that they cannot successfully coerce the United States by threatening a biological attack. If attacked, the United States must have the ability to withstand the attack, identify the attacker, and respond appropriately. If the United States is unable to successfully deter or respond to an attack, it will set a dangerous precedent and send a message to adversaries and "would be" aggressors that the U.S. is subject to coercion through the threat of biological warfare.
In presenting the argument, this paper will first review the effects of the anthrax attacks of 2001, examine current deterrence arguments, and discuss the role of nuclear weapons and the New Triad. It will then discuss the likely operating environment and biological threat in the 2035 timeframe in order to arrive at biodefense imperatives for the United States as it moves beyond classic, "old triad" thinking and deterrence concepts in order to sufficiently deter or defend against a looming and growing biological warfare threat.
II. The Anthrax Attacks of 2001
Dramatic advances in biotechnology will make the development and weaponization of biowarfare agents much easier and less expensive for rogue nation states and non-state actors.
Given the relative ease of developing and hiding biowarfare capability, it is quite possible that potential future adversaries will attempt to weaken, coerce or deter the United States through the threatened or actual use of biological weapons. The post-9/11 anthrax attacks served as the clarion call as to the potentially deadly and disruptive force of a biological attack on the United
States.
The post-9/11 anthrax attacks, in which letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to The USPS also suffered a significant decline in mail volume in the first month after the attack as major mailers sought assurances regarding the safety of the system and customers demonstrated a reluctance to receive and read their mail. 12 Based on internal projections, lost revenue to the USPS in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attack was estimated at $500 million for the three weeks ending 2 October 2001 and resulted in a great deal of speculation as to the economic viability of a key government service provider already facing economic problems. 13 The financial cost in terms of lost sales by direct mailers is unknown.
While the post-9/11 anthrax attacks were costly and had an appreciable adverse affect on the American public, the welcomed lack of a replication of this attack in the United States has dimmed the collective memory and consciousness of the public as to the potential risks of biological warfare or bioterrorism. The resultant complacence in the matter of biosecurity is not shared by those in the homeland security and biodefense arenas. 
III. Deterrence Revisited
"Deterrence" is a frequently but easily misunderstood term which should be defined at the beginning of any discussion. Consequently, the notion of deterrence from the standpoint of the U.S. defense establishment, as well as academia, was tied most directly to the United States' nuclear capability and credibility.
In addition to fielding a potent nuclear force, the United States sought to build substantial conventional capability and partner with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to
give itself a measure of credibility and non-nuclear options in its bi-polar struggle with the Soviet Union. Despite the efforts to build conventional force strength in Europe, the U.S.
nuclear arsenal maintained primacy for "with nuclear weapons in the background, it was difficult for a distinctive body of conventional deterrence theory to develop."
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The strong, Cold War linkage between nuclear weapons and deterrence is demonstrated in Organski and Kugler's landmark work, The War Ledger, in which the authors state, "In deterrence theory it is terror that deters but nuclear weapons that are the source of that terror.
Appropriately, therefore, nuclear weapons are called 'deterrents. '" 19 Creating such a synonymous relationship between these words strikes at the primacy of nuclear weapons as the deterrent weapon of choice and is evident in the rather narrow definition of the Cold War triad, which focused solely on nuclear weapons and their various means of delivery to the target.
In general, the Cold War nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union "worked" because both parties possessed a degree of nuclear symmetry and parity, understood each other's threats, believed in their mutual intent to engage in nuclear conflict if their vital interests were attacked, and decided that the costs of a nuclear exchange outweighed the prospective benefits of their actions during the Cold War.
In The Great American Gamble, Keith Payne declares the "balance of terror" as an maintain its commitment to not using biological warfare agents offensively, the U.S. would be forced to decide how to respond, in an unlike manner, to a biological threat or attack.
The devastating effects of 9/11 were most significant in that they signaled the catastrophic and asymmetric effects that a small group of individuals, a non-state actor in this case, can achieve with a devious plan and a minimum of funding. The attacks of 9/11, because they resulted in such a large loss of life and such a tremendous impact to the economy and Bush states the strategy is founded on two pillars: 1) the promotion of freedom, justice and human dignity, and 2) confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. 23 The United States must maintain its freedom of action if these pursuits are to continue to serve as the pillars of the U.S. national security strategy. Soviet Union, the United States has had great freedom of action in the use of its diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of power.
Biological warfare or bioterrorism have the potential to significantly affect U.S. freedom of action. Credible asymmetric threats, such as the threat posed by some biological weapons, specifically those for which the U.S. has no good counteraction, have the potential to hold U.S. citizens or deployed military members at risk, thus potentially deterring the United States from taking action it deems necessary in pursuit of its national interests.
The United States must determine the combination of capabilities it will need to deter and defend against biological weapons whose use may be threatened or employed against its territory or personnel. Clearly, the value of nuclear weapons in countering the dynamic threat posed by biological weapons must be visited as part of this discussion. To dismiss nuclear weapons as strictly the vestiges of the Cold War would be less than prudent.
IV. Nuclear Weapons and The New Triad
With the arrival of a new Presidential administration, the United States has the opportunity for a wholesale reevaluation of its nuclear deterrent and defensive posture. In the post-election press, much has been made of the state of the United States nuclear weapons states "offensive operations may include kinetic (both conventional and nuclear) and/or nonkinetic options (e.g., information operations) to deter or defeat a WMD threat or subsequent use national security purposes. RRW will: assure long-term confidence in the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, enhance security and prevent unauthorized use, improve the safety of the nuclear weapons stockpile, help to develop a nuclear weapons infrastructure that is more responsive to future national security needs, enable a reduced stockpile size, decrease the likelihood that an underground nuclear test will be needed, utilize and sustain critical nuclear weapons design and skills. Perhaps not fully understanding of the expanding threat of non-nuclear WMD and the unparalleled deterrent value of nuclear weapons, some proponents of nuclear disarmament advocate that the United States "must establish as official policy the limited purpose of U.S.
nuclear forces: to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others. Other purposes are no longer realistic or necessary for the United States." 34 If the U.S. were to take such unilateral action, it would cause the nation to assume a degree of risk in regard to adversaries considering an attack using WMD. Doing so would essentially amount to removing the biggest arrow from the U.S.
quiver when contemplating preemptive or post-attack options.
Foster and Payne aptly summarize their position with regard to the maintenance of nuclear weapons, stating, "the question is not whether we (in the United States) "want" to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence. It is whether we are willing to accept the risk of deterrence failure that would be introduced by our inability to threaten some adversaries' highly-valued targets that may be essentially impervious to non-nuclear weapons and/or our inability to threaten nuclear escalation in response to severe provocation…the move to reliance on non nuclear weapons to hold enemy targets at risk would carry the increased risk of deterrence failure and the probability may not be low." While advocates of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear-free world continue to discuss and publish their positions regarding the need for U.S. leadership in this cause, the fact remains that U.S. nuclear weapons systems possess the ability to cause "predictable, rapid, and certain destruction of the target, and therefore are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage." 36 This capability is as yet absent in any other U.S. weapon system, and it is unlikely that any such weapon will be developed in the near future. Therefore, nuclear weapons will likely continue to play an important role in the U.S. deterrence posture, to include the deterrence of biological attacks against U.S. interests.
While acknowledging the significance of nuclear weapons as a deterrent capability, the U.S. acknowledged the need to expand the options available to the President to deter and defend against catastrophic threats to national interests. As a result of the Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, the United States introduced the New Triad, which expanded the triad concept beyond that of the classic mix of manned bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles.
-Defenses (both active and passive); and -A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats. options that will be needed to formulate effective policy options and systems acquisition to defend U.S. interests in the future operating environment.
V. The Future Operating Environment
Before discussing the particulars of the biological threat, it is instructive to examine the characteristics that have been ascribed to the world in the year 2035 timeframe. While no one institution or document, including this paper, can claim to have arrived at the "ground truth" in characterizing the environment for such a distant time horizon, a review of various studies is beneficial in ascertaining some common themes in the literature, as they may pertain to the United States' relative power and ability to contend with threats to its national security.
Relative Decline in U.S. Power
The convergence of the exponentially increasing pace of technological change, globalization, and ideological challenges to its core beliefs and practices will threaten the ability of the United States to protect its citizens, overseas personnel, and national interests in general. Chief of Staff, offers a synopsis which is quite consistent with much of the thought about the future environment, stating "future enemies will be motivated by resources, fear, and hate; empowered through education, and enabled through technology and globalization to directly challenge the United States. The enemy will be different-the targets they present in 2030 will be more difficult to find, harder to hit, more widely distributed and more dangerous."
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China and Russia
Despite their seemingly divergent trajectories, China and Russia will likely remain as prominent nation-states in the world order. Both nations are significant players with which the U.S. must continue to interact and engage due to their past and potential capabilities in the areas of science and technology, both in military and non-military application. While Russia has come upon new-found wealth due to its petroleum and natural gas exports, there is little evidence that its wealth is being used to improve the quality of life of the majority of the populace or recapitalize its brittle infrastructure. 50 While underfunding these areas, it is highly likely that Russia will maintain its "crown jewel"-the strategic nuclear forces.
"With their vast and increasingly capable nuclear arsenal, the Russians remain a superpower in nuclear terms, despite their demographic and political difficulties."
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The Advancement and Diffusion of Technology
Increasingly available and cheap technology will continue to give high-powered computing and information-sharing access to people worldwide. Information that was in the past only available to those who had direct access will continue to be digitized, catalogued, and uploaded to the Internet for review and use by any interested party. This rapidly evolving phenomenon will only increase with the ever-increasing speed, miniaturization, and storage capacity of personal computers. 2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict" 65 As a signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention, it can be safely concluded that the U.S.
will not in the future pursue the use of offensive biological weapons as a deterrent or retaliatory counter to biological weapons deployed against it and attributable to an adversary. Therefore, the United States will need to rely on either other offensive capabilities or biodefensive capabilities to deter or prevail against a biological attack.
While the United States is not pursuing biological weapons, there is evidence to support that others state actors are or have done so in the recent past. "Today, several important countries-Egypt, Israel, and Syria among them-remain outside the Biological Weapons
Convention. The U.S. State Department has also expressed concern that some parties to the treaty, such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, may be pursuing offensive biological weapons programs in secret" 66 Nation-states that are active in the research and/or development of biowarfare agents may further contribute to potential proliferation due to either dubious relationships with non-state actors or via inadequate measures to secure the facilities where research is conducted.
Concerns regarding the proliferation and possible near-term use of biowarfare agents are central themes of World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. "It is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.
The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon." 67 This report, commissioned by Congress as a result of 9/11 Commission recommendations, is direct in its findings. It is notable in that it identifies a fundamental distinction between the United States' aggressive actions to prevent the 66 Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, World at Risk, 9-10. 67 Ibid., xv.
proliferation of nuclear material and technology versus its failure to work as diligently in the area of biological weapons.
The nuclear age began with a mushroom cloud-and from that moment on, all those who worked in the nuclear industry in any capacity military or civilian, understood they must work and live under a clear and undeniable security mandate. But the life sciences community has never experienced a comparable iconic event.
As a result, security awareness has grown slowly, lagging behind the emergence of biological risks and threats. States has demonstrated through its policy and obligations that it recognizes the current and future destructive potential of biological agents.
Attributes of Biological Weapons
Due to their size and physical properties, biological weapons are inherently an offensive weapon. A very small quantity of a bioagent can be aerosolized and spread clandestinely by the perpetrator in the target area. Once dispersed, the perpetrator can leave the area without fear of detection or capture. Due to the incubation period, the affects of bioweapons are not realized until people begin to feel ill and enter into public health care facilities. Furthermore, the nature of the public health crisis-indeed, the establishment of the occurrence of a biological attack may be delayed until the public health care system can characterize the agent and correlate the reported cases.
These attributes, along with their low cost of production and the difficulty of detecting biological weapons labs and programs may make them attractive to nations or groups that do not have the technical expertise or funds to pursue other forms of weaponry. "This is reflected in the 68 Ibid., xvii.
findings of a 1969 United Nations study that estimated that cost of causing civilian casualties per square kilometer was $2,000 with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with chemical weapons and only $1 with biological weapons. 69 The biological labs that can produce agents so cheaply have an especially "small footprint and their dual-use nature makes detection of a bio weapons program particularly challenging."
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Biotechnological Horizons
To be sure, the attributes of biological weapons are great cause for concern today, but scientific advances in the life sciences and exponential gains in computing power per dollar will certainly yield not only heretofore unimaginable developments in medical science and treatment, but the potential for exceptionally stealthy and deadly biological weapons in the future.
Dr. George Poste, the Director of Arizona State University's Biodesign Institute and the former chairman of a Secretary of Defense bioterrorism task force, puts it bluntly, "The threat of biological warfare is real and growing-the genie is out of the bottle." 71 "The globalization of biotechnology industries is spreading expertise and capabilities and increasing the accessibility of biological pathogens suitable for disruptive attacks." 72 The progress of the industry in the area of genetic engineering is particularly concerning.
"Scientists have developed automated machines that can synthesize long strands of DNA coding for genes and even entire microbial genomes. By piecing together large fragments of genetic material synthesized in the laboratory, scientists have been able to assemble infectious viruses. 73 The manipulation of genes to create new pathogenic characteristics (increased survivability, infectivity, virulence, drug resistance) is central to genetic engineering in the biological warfare or biological terrorism context. Organisms with altered characteristics are the "next generation" biological weapons. 74 "Chemical and biological threats may eventually merge as we understand more about small, "manufacturable" molecules that can subtly alter human behavior." 75 "Biological warfare will be more than "bugs" (biological agents) in the future. By discerning the circuit diagram of every cell in the body, future chemical weapons will be much less crude. We need a much
expanded definition of what biodefense represents." 76 One aspect of technological advancement that has the potential to increase the availability and lethality of biological weapons is nanotechnology. "Nanotechnology concerns the ability to understand and manipulate the environment at the nano-meter scale." 77 As previously mentioned, technology convergence will likely increase current threats. "The ability to combine several technologies can make this threat far more difficult to anticipate and control. Consider bioweapons that may be tailored to specific targets and groups:
• Synthetic biology with custom logic will be used to bring down communication and transportation networks, and select media.
• Deadly biological agents will be introduced into targeted ethnic and religious groups that will be difficult or invisible to detect.
• Deadly biological plant viruses will be used against agriculture crops of targeted groups or nations, crippling the food supply.
• Deadly biological agents introduced to animal feed and grain supply diminishing cattle, chicken, sheep, and fish farms.
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Testimony from biotechnology experts and a review of the technical literature point to the same conclusion--new and highly modified forms of biological warfare agents will have an increased potential to be produced, weaponized, and utilized in the next 20 to 30 years. The confluence of ever-expanding biotech research, computing technology, and the explosion in the proliferation and availability of information will provide unprecedented capability to individuals, non-state actors, and nations, regardless of their motivation and intent. In the area of biotechnology, it will be more difficult than ever to distinguish the "haves" from the "have nots."
This will vastly complicate national security implications for the United States. Biodefense capability serves as a complimentary deterrent capability. Given the United States' overmatch capability in nuclear, conventional, and special operations, a potential adversary may elect not pursue a biological attack option if that adversary knows or believes that 83 Ibid. 84 John Caves, e-mail to author, 21 November 2008. U.S. biodefense capability can detect and defeat the effects of the attack, allow the U.S. to positively attribute the attack to an adversary, and give the U.S. the ability to quickly respond using any of its suite of overmatch capabilities to eradicate the adversary threat. This level of biodefensive capability removes the asymmetric advantage of the offensive that would otherwise be accrued to the adversary.
VII. Biodefense Imperatives
To achieve this biodefensive posture, Dr. Poste has identified a set of key capabilities he refers to as a '3-legged stool,' consisting of early detection, forensic attribution, and the rapid mobilization of therapies and vaccines against any agent.
85 While each of these capabilities is important in its own right, they are all needed to establish a truly effective biodefensive and deterrent posture. Because they are mutually dependent, the loss of any one of these capabilities would significantly detract from the deterrent value of the U.S. biodefensive capability.
The matter of early detection begins the time-critical chain of biodefensive capabilities. (chemical warfare agent/biological warfare agent) threat clouds on the battlefield. The goal of the program is to provide a system that can rapidly detect and identify the presence of a typical threat cloud and provide a countermeasure to that cloud that will kill it before it reaches the intended target." 88 From a deterrent standpoint, Dr. Wood believes, "If we had a capability like TACTIC, where they (the enemy) knew we could neutralize the threat, it simply wouldn't make sense to pursue (a biological attack)." 89 The early detection aspect will also be critical beyond the tactical battlefield, which in the future operational environment will likely assume decreased importance as adversaries seek to bypass the U.S. military to secure political objectives by directly attacking the U.S. homeland.
Homeland Security Presidential
The current BioWatch program, which "monitors the air over major cities for biological releases" 90 is a step in the right direction, but it has been identified as lacking in its rapid detection capability because as "the sniffers'" filters must be checked manually and transported to labs for diagnosis, detecting the germs can take up to 36 hours." 91 Future networked systems will need to be wholly automated and will need to be "pointed" based on current intelligence if the U.S. is to quickly detect and react against a biological attack. This will be no simple task.
As Dr. Poste states, "Creation of an information architecture to integrate the information coming from a network of sensors will be a big challenge." 92 Once a biological attack has been detected, it will be critically important to identify the source of the attack. The ability to attribute the attack to a particular entity is absolutely indispensible if the United States is to have any credibility in deterring an attack or deciding on how to react with respect to an adversary after the fact. Likewise, since biological weapons are well-suited to covert use, the ability to identify and interdict an attacker in the pre-attack phase would qualify as the best case scenario.
In either case, the advances in biotechnology will allow technicians to use "immunosignatures" to identify a particular individual's exposure to any number of biological agents. In this way, authorities would be able to identify those who have been working in a This technology, which is currently in the advanced research stage, has great potential for allowing forensic attribution.
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Concurrent with post-attack forensic attribution, the United States would be required to commence a rapid and intensive mobilization of therapies and vaccines against biological agents.
According to Dr. Poste, the transformational event will be the way in which the biotechnology industry develops vaccines. The U.S. will need the ability "to take the 'bug,' sequence its genes, look at those genes to see what protein they are coding for, and then produce a vaccine rapidly.
Right now, we have to grow the bug. We are still using methods from the 1850s developed by Mr. Caves uses the term "deterrence by approbation" to explain a similar philosophy, "the thrust of which is that whatever can be done to strengthen the international norm against the development, possession, and use of biological weapons (and other WMD) can serve as a deterrent to adversaries who are concerned about how their actions are viewed by their constituencies. Even Al Qaeda and its ilk have constituencies that they seek to appeal to and upon whom they depend for support."
96
VIII. Recommendations and Conclusion
Recommendations
Over the next 30 years, the convergence of advancing science, computing power, and information technology will allow for exponential gains in the field of biotechnology. United States will not have the ability to stem the proliferation of this inherently dual-use technology, nor the ability to deter its harmful use through "traditional" means of deterrence in an increasingly complex future operating environment, the following measures should be taken by the U.S. in order to deter, and if needed, defeat potential bioterrorism or biological warfare threats to the U.S. and its interests:
1. Maintain the current functions and national security policies associated with the New Triad. U.S. nuclear capability remains an unmatched deterrent, with no weapons of similarly rapid and powerful effect on the horizon.
2. Augment the New Triad by further developing biodefense capabilities to produce a "deterrence by denial" effect to dissuade attack by an adversary that would otherwise be undeterrable; the '3-legged stool' capabilities include early detection, forensic attribution, and the rapid mobilization of therapies and vaccines against any agent.
3. Develop and expand international political and scientific interaction and engagement to foster "deterrence by approbation," strengthening norms against the use of biological weapons, thus denying potential adversaries from achieving their political objectives regardless of success at the tactical level.
Conclusion
This paper examined the rapid advances in biotechnology and the potential of its use by adversaries against the United States in the 2035 timeframe. The dual-use nature of biotechnology makes it exceptionally difficult to regulate and monitor for possible nefarious use.
The relatively low expenses associated with establishing a biowarfare program and the ease with which such programs are kept covert will enable potential adversaries, both state and non-state, to harness the power of biotechnology in an attack on the United States or its interests.
Despite the current and projected advances in biotechnology, and the resulting potential threat to national security, the United States defense establishment has focused its attention largely on the concept of deterrence as it relates to nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons will remain the sine qua non of U.S. deterrence policy for the foreseeable future. The rapid, certain Office was estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Despite the short-term impacts and the fear induced by the American public, the memory of the attack has largely faded, even as the potential for a future, more deadly attack grows.
The risk of a future biological attack against the U.S. is increased by a number of factors attributed to the future operating environment. It is likely that the U.S. will wield relatively less power in an era where the convergence of information access, exponential technological change, and globalization empower previously isolated individuals and groups whose values run counter to those of the United States. China and Russia, though trending in different directions, are likely to be formidable near-peers who have the scientific and research base needed to develop and maintain robust weapons programs. Russia will remain a nuclear power which once harbored the world's most extensive biological warfare program. China is a rising economic power with a desire to assert itself as a major military player. It is making the investment in its human capital to become a world leader in science and technology, thus enabling its potential martial prowess. In general, information access, globalization, and transnational forces will challenge the primacy of the nation-states, especially those whose problems are exacerbated by a lack of resources to address their urgent problems. These factors will conspire to complicate the security environment for the United States.
Biotechnological advances will have a profound effect on the capability of mankind to alter organisms at the most basic level. The ability to manufacture material at the molecular level may result in new weapons which will likely require new definitions of biological weapons and biodefense. Future bioweapons may include agents that may be targeted toward specific genetic traits or races, as well as bioagents that may be administered to lie dormant until activated by another means. In addition to direct biological attacks on humans, alternate attacks may include bioagents that attack infrastructure systems and critical food supplies.
While the U.S. has made significant strides in biodefense initiatives since the anthrax attacks of 2001, much work remains to be done as biotechnological science advances around the
